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Abstract
Despite their differing approaches to counterterrorism, virtually all African states 
endorsed the adoption of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on 
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention) in July 1999. 
The Algiers Convention was the first continental legislative instrument to provide a 
definition of terrorism. Thus, Africa had a common approach to counterterrorism at 
least two years before the events of 11 September 2001 and the adoption of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373. 
The EU has the capacity to pursue counterterrorism effectively while enhancing 
development and social justice, and building democracy in Africa. This paper 
examines the nature of the EU’s counterterrorism policies and strategies. It discusses 
the implementation of these policies with a focus on how their implementation has 
affected democracy building processes in Africa. It explores attitudes in Africa to 
global, including EU, counterterrorism strategies, and provides options for the EU in 
combating terrorism in Africa effectively while at the same time enhancing human 
rights and building democracy there. On the basis of the analysis, it concludes that 
many people in Africa believe the best way to tackle terrorism on the continent is to 
alleviate poverty, eliminate social injustice and assist with building democracy.
Summary of Recommendations
The EU would make a great difference in Africa if it adopted the view that building 
democracy and enhancing social justice are preconditions for the reduction or 
elimination of the factors that generate terrorism. 
In Africa, the fight against terrorism is primarily a governance issue. The EU should 
encourage the promotion of good and responsible governance as a way of tackling the 
root causes of terrorism. Terrorism emerges from, and thrives in, conditions in which 
democracy, human rights and social justice are perceived to be absent. Bad governance, 
corruption or a lack of professionalism in the security forces make it easier for foreign-
trained terrorists to carry out their activities. 
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The EU needs to focus on working with governments as well as civil society 
organizations to strengthen democratic processes. For example, the EU could train 
young Africans in proper processes of governance so that they can provide leadership 
at the governmental or civil society level. The EU could also help fund weak, but non-
corrupt, civil society organizations so that they can scrutinize and stand up to their 
governments. Above all, the EU could help African states and societies to nurture an 
independent media and ensure that corrupt politicians do not pass legislation that 
muzzles the media. 
The EU needs to undertake targeted capacity-building to ensure that the goals of 
prevention, protection, pursuit and response are replicated in Africa,. It needs to help 
African states train personnel capable of detecting terrorists. It also needs to retrain 
and sensitize African security personnel to human rights and democratic norms so they 
can protect their societies, and pursue the terrorists, without undermining democratic 
principles. 
However, in pursuing its goals, the EU needs to be aware of the political and cultural 
sensitivities of the African people.
1. Introduction
Transnational terrorism, whatever its causes or bases, seeks to intimidate people, 
societies and governments. It also threatens security and undermines both human rights 
and democratic processes. While some security analysts have attempted to portray the 
current wave of terrorism as a struggle between Islam and the West, such a portrait is 
misleading and counterproductive. Terrorists have threatened all types of societies and 
states, from the United States, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to Spain, the United 
Kingdom and Kenya. For this reason, all societies and states, irrespective of religious or 
cultural orientation, have an obligation to take appropriate measures to eliminate the 
root causes of terrorism and to prevent terrorists from achieving their political goals. 
However, it is generally acknowledged that an effective fight against transnational 
terrorism is beyond the capacity of a single state and, therefore, requires cooperation 
between various countries and organizations. It is largely for this reason that the 
European Union’s counterterrorism policies and strategies are predicated on cooperation 
within the EU as well as cooperation between the EU and other states, the United 
Nations and regional organizations around the world (Council of the European Union, 
2003).
It is also recognized that democracy has become a global entitlement, which must be 
enjoyed by all societies and states. Governments all over the world, irrespective of their 
historical conditions, have an obligation to build democracy. It is partly for this reason 
that Thomas Franck has claimed that human rights and democracy have become ‘a 
normative rule of the international system’. He has posited that democracy ‘is on the 
way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and 
protected by collective international processes’ (Franck 1992). 
Therefore, it is expected that all public policies, including defence and security 
policies, must respect human rights and adhere to democratic norms. Indeed, one 
leading counterterrorism scholar, Paul Wilkinson, has argued that liberal democracy 
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is so important that there can be no justification for undermining it in pursuit of 
counterterrorism (Wilkinson 2006). Wilkinson has postulated that the ‘primary 
objective of counterterrorist strategy must be the protection and maintenance of liberal 
democracy and the rule of law’. He has argued that ‘this aim overrides in importance 
even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence’ (Wilkinson 1977).
On the basis of the above understandings, this paper examines the nature of the EU’s 
counterterrorism policies and strategies. It discusses the implementation of these policies 
with a focus on how their implementation has affected democracy building processes 
in Africa. It explores attitudes in Africa to global, including EU, counterterrorism 
strategies, and provides options for the EU in combating terrorism in Africa effectively 
while at the same time enhancing human rights and building democracy there.
The main message of this paper is that the EU has the capacity to pursue counterterrorism 
effectively while enhancing development and social justice and building democracy in 
Africa.
2. The European Union’s Counterterrorism Policies
What are the policies that guide the EU in the fight against terrorism? To what extent 
do these policies reinforce or undermine human rights and the principles on which 
democracy is based? Some EU member states, such as Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain 
and the UK, passed counterterrorism laws and formulated strategies decades ago, but 
many of these were not conceived in a framework that would enhance human rights 
and promote democracy (Martin 2006). This paper is concerned with the policies 
enunciated by the EU that came into effect in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
in the USA of 11 September 2001. The Administration of US President George W. 
Bush promoted counterterrorism measures that ignored or undermined human rights, 
international law and international norms, and the world was curious to see whether 
the EU would follow the US example or design its own template. As it turned out, the 
EU template on counterterrorism was grounded in respect for human rights and in 
democratic principles and processes.
While it is plausible to associate the recent EU focus on 
counterterrorism with the events of 11 September 2001, 
and the subsequent UN Security Council resolution 
1373 of 28 September 2001, the EU strategy can also be 
explained by the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 
2004 and London in July 2005, and other threats that EU 
member states have faced or foiled in recent years. All the 
principal decision-making organs of the EU – the Council 
of the European Union, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission – have been involved in shaping EU 
counterterrorism strategies. 
The EU counterterrorism policy documents claim that the EU is committed to combating 
terrorism locally and globally while respecting human rights and democratic principles. 
This is a clear refutation of US strategy under George W. Bush, which undermined the 
Geneva conventions and condoned the torture of suspected terrorists. According to 
the policy documents, the EU is committed to jointly fighting against terrorism and 
The EU counterterrorism policy documents claim that 
the EU is committed to combating terrorism locally 
and globally while respecting human rights and 
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strategy under George W. Bush, which undermined 
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to providing the best possible protection for its citizens. While proclaiming its global 
ambition, the EU strategy is primarily continental. Its main purpose is to ‘make Europe 
safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice’. The main 
document that guides EU counterterrorism strategy is the ‘Action Plan to Combat 
Terrorism’, which was adopted by the Council in June 2004.
In December 2005, the EU announced that its efforts in the fight against terrorism 
would focus on four main goals: prevention, protection, pursuit and response. To 
differentiate itself from the USA, and in the hope of providing alternative leadership 
worldwide, the EU proclaimed that it was committed to pursuing these goals ‘in a 
democratic and accountable way’. The EU counterterrorism strategy, like its security 
policy, is subject to political oversight. 
With regard to prevention, the EU aims to address the root causes of terrorism or tackle 
the factors that lead to radicalization and recruitment not only in Europe, but also 
globally. These factors include the lack of democracy, the flagrant abuse of human rights 
and rampant corruption. These underlying causes of terrorism are also prevalent outside 
Africa, but in some African states the situation is deteriorating and they are being 
exacerbated. The post-election violence in Kenya in 2008; the drastic deterioration in 
economic, political and social conditions in Zimbabwe in recent years; the military 
coup in Guinea in late 2008; and the continuing conflicts in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Somalia are just the main examples. The prevention of terrorism in 
Africa requires strategies that aim to engender development and empower the people as 
well as to build and enhance democracy. The term development is used here to refer to 
self-sustained economic growth as well as the provision of basic needs, such as shelter, 
water, sanitation, health services and education.
In terms of protection, the EU seeks to improve the security of borders, transport systems 
and critical infrastructure, and thereby reduce the vulnerability of its member states 
and their citizens to terrorist attacks. This stems from the fact that in the majority of the 
recent attacks in Western countries, terrorists have targeted the critical infrastructure, 
and especially the transport network. For example, the Madrid and London attacks of 
2004 and 2005, respectively, targeted vital transport systems, and the then vulnerable 
air transport system in the USA was targeted in 2001. Unfortunately, public transport 
systems in most countries cannot be fully protected against every possible terrorist 
attack. 
With regard to the goal of pursuit, the EU aims to go after and investigate terrorists 
in Europe and globally, and to bring them to justice. It also plans to disrupt their 
networks, cut off their funding and impede their planning, travel and communications. 
Controlling the financing for terrorism requires considerable cooperation across 
boundaries, and between government and non-government entities. Given the porous 
nature of the borders of many African states and the lack of the capacity to control 
or monitor those who enter or leave these countries, the fight against terrorism will 
require the commitment of resources and capacity-building on a grand scale. For 
example, it would take many years and huge amounts of resources for countries such as 
Mozambique and Tanzania to be able to patrol their long and exposed Indian Ocean 
coastlines effectively.
The final component of the EU counterterrorism policy focuses on response. The EU 
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aims to minimize the consequences of terrorist attacks by 
coordinating responses to such attacks within the EU and 
across the world, and by improving capabilities for dealing 
with the aftermath – including the needs of victims. 
An effective response to terrorist attacks calls for greater 
cooperation across borders and for highly trained personnel 
in security agencies and the law enforcement sector within 
the EU. It also requires trained and competent personnel in 
the countries that are expected to cooperate with the EU. 
3. The Implementation of the EU’s 
Counterterrorism Policies
The implementation of the EU’s counterterrorism policies takes place in the four areas 
represented by its main goals. As part of its implementation arrangements, the Council 
of the European Union requires the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to report every six 
months on how the ‘Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’ is progressing. 
Implementation takes place on three levels: at the member state level; at the collective 
EU level; and through EU interaction with the rest of the world. At the first level, 
the EU assumes that the primary responsibility for combating terrorism rests with 
the individual member states. Therefore, a lot of activity takes place at the state 
level. However, at the next level, the EU has sought to add value to these efforts by 
strengthening the capabilities of some member states and by facilitating cooperation 
among them. For example, it has encouraged collective responses through various EU 
organs, including Europol, Eurojust and Frontex. 
The implementation of EU policies at the third level has considerable relevance for 
Africa. At this level, the EU and its member states have sought international partnerships 
through the United Nations and with other countries, such as the USA and Canada 
as well as various Middle East and Asian states. In Africa, the EU and its member 
states deal simultaneously with the African Union (AU), the regional economic 
communities, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community 
of Western African States (ECOWAS), and individual states. 
The Africa-EU strategic partnership calls for cooperation 
in many areas, including politics, development and security 
(European Commission/African Union Commission 2007). 
This partnership provides multiple avenues through which 
the EU and African states can explore how to pursue 
counterterrorism while enhancing democracy. The push for 
democracy building, however, will have the greatest impact 
at the state level and the least impact at the AU and the 
regional economic community levels. It is relatively easy for 
the AU and the regional economic communities to endorse 
radical change because they know they are not responsible for implementing it at the 
state level.
One way of assessing the EU’s implementation of its counterterrorism strategy is to 
Implementation takes place on three levels: at the 
member state level; at the collective EU level; and 
through EU interaction with the rest of the world. 
At the first level, the EU assumes that the primary 
responsibility for combating terrorism rests with the 
individual member states. Therefore, a lot of activity 
takes place at the state level. However, at the next 
level, the EU has sought to add value to these efforts 
by strengthening the capabilities of some member 
states and by facilitating cooperation among them.
The push for democracy building will have the  
greatest impact at the state level and the least  
impact at the AU and the regional economic  
community levels. It is relatively easy for the AU and 
the regional economic communities to endorse radical 
change because they know they are not responsible 
for implementing it at the state level.
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examine its activities in terms of the four counterterrorism goals set out in the ‘Action 
Plan to Combat Terrorism’.
Violent radicalization is not just an aid to terrorism, but also a threat to democracy in 
developing countries. For this reason, the findings of these studies on radicalization 
could be applied to Africa where they could ‘kill two birds with one stone’. As African 
state institutions are still relatively new, weak and fragile, radicalization is likely to have 
a greater political impact in Africa than in much of Europe. For example, according to 
the latest report of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to the Council of the EU 
dated 19 November 2008, most activities in relation to prevention were concentrated 
in Europe. Earlier in 2006, the EU Commission had set up an expert group on violent 
radicalization. The expert group’s final report entitled, Radicalization processes leading to 
acts of terrorism, was presented to member states in September 2008. In the same month, 
the Commission published a series of studies that tackle the issue of radicalization. 
This followed the fact that several member states, including Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK had coordinated counter-terrorism policies on 
different aspects of radicalization.
On protection, the latest report from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 
demonstrates that most activities revolve around such issues as border security, 
critical infrastructure protection, the security of explosives and transport security. For 
understandable reasons, most of these activities are confined to Europe. For example, 
on border security the focus is on proposals relating to the implementation of the 
second Schengen Information System (SIS II) and other 
immigration issues. Knowledge taken from these activities, 
such as the enhancement of transport security and critical 
infrastructure security, could be modified and applied to 
Africa, where it would have positive effects on development, 
democracy building and counterterrorism.
Implementation of the third goal of the European strategy against terrorism – the 
pursuit and investigation of terrorists across borders – goes beyond Europe into Africa 
and other places. For example, on the question of operational cooperation, a Joint 
Customs Operation, ATHENA, focusing on money laundering linked to financing 
terrorism and other illicit activities took place in September 2008. Those participating 
included the customs administrations of 22 EU member states, together with three 
African countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) as well as Croatia and Norway. Other 
initiatives have touched on cooperation in the areas of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, 
as well as proposals on improved data sharing.
The EU’s Counterterrorism Activity in Africa and its Impact on 
Democracy Building 
Much of what the EU does in Africa is undertaken within the framework of The 
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (European Commission/African Union Commission 
2007). The first paragraph of this document states: ‘Africa and Europe are bound 
together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community 
of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule 
of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the 
constitutive texts of our respective Unions’. The document also states that the EU and 
Violent radicalization is not just an aid to terror-
ism, but also a threat to democracy in developing 
countries. 
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its member states ‘are well placed to provide continued and 
increased support for the [African Union] in its efforts to … 
operationalize the [African Peace and Security Architecture], 
including through long-term capacity building for the 
various structures provided therein’ (Paragraph 17). 
Under the partnership, the two sides commit themselves ‘to 
the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 
1325 on Women in Peace and Security and 1612 on Children 
in Armed Conflicts’ (Paragraph 22). The EU and the AU 
are therefore interested in engaging in activities that protect 
children in wars, empower women, and offer protection 
to women in situations of war and conflict. Accordingly, the EU has participated 
in capacity-building in Africa through the AU, the regional economic communities 
and national governments. At the continental level, for example, most AU organs are 
modelled on those of the EU. The first impression gained from an examination of 
the structure and organs of the AU is that the two organizations are quite similar – 
but appearances can be deceptive. The goals of the EU emanate from deeply rooted 
European values and traditions, and although many of these are regarded as global, 
some African leaders have not fully internalized them. This partly explains why the 
practices of the AU have not caught up with those of the EU, despite the fact that the 
two organizations have similar organs. However, there is a possibility that sustained 
EU-AU engagement could, in the long-term, result in a convergence of practices. 
In the domain of security, the EU Political and Security Committee (EU-PSC) and 
the AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) have held regular consultations on 
security matters, including the operationalization of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture, especially as it relates to the Continental Early Warning System and 
the African Standby Force. The EU has also funded the African Centre for the Study 
and Research on Terrorism, which was established in Algiers in 2004. The purpose 
of this centre is to centralize information on terrorism and terrorist organizations in 
Africa, initiate research and organize training programmes and symposia with a view 
to raising awareness of the threat of terrorism on the continent. The main weakness of 
this initiative is that its activities are not adequately located within the framework of 
building or promoting democracy.
The EU has also funded a counterterrorism programme through IGAD. The IGAD 
Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) was established in 2006 and 
is based in Addis Ababa. ICPAT is currently guided by a Steering Committee made up 
of local ministerial representatives of IGAD member states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sudan and Uganda, Eritrea is not a participant). The six donor countries (Canada, 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) sit on the steering committee as 
non-voting members. This is also a venue in which the fight against terrorism should be 
viewed in terms of development and democracy building, but ICPAT is not sufficiently 
equipped to do so.
International efforts to combat terrorism in Africa, including EU activities, have helped 
to raise awareness of the dangers of transnational terrorism, but they have not paid 
sufficient attention to the need to respect human rights and build democracy. As a 
result, some African leaders have used the bogey of terrorism to halt progress towards 
International efforts to combat terrorism in Africa, 
including EU activities, have helped to raise  
awareness of the dangers of transnational terror-
ism, but they have not paid sufficient attention to 
the need to respect human rights and build  
democracy. As a result, some African leaders have 
used the bogey of terrorism to halt progress  
towards genuine democracy on the continent.
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genuine democracy on the continent. Other African leaders, 
especially those who are keen to consolidate democracy, 
have been frustrated by the global pressure to experiment 
with new counterterrorism measures, which could constrain 
political and civil liberties and eventually serve as an aid to 
the goals of the terrorists. What has taken place in Africa 
in relation to terrorism, counterterrorism and human 
security in the past decade suggests that there are many 
perspectives.
4. Africa’s Perspectives on Global 
Counterterrorism Strategies
Most African analysts and policymakers are concerned about 
a number of issues relating to the fight against transnational 
terrorism. Some of their grievances can be explained in terms 
of a lack of a sense of ownership and a negative perception 
of the global flow of knowledge. The Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership document states that ‘EU support to Africa 
has been and continues to be guided by the principle of 
African ownership’ (Paragraph 18). However, some African 
policymakers and analysts believe that they do not have 
ownership of the counterterrorism programmes and policies that they are required to 
implement, because these policies and programmes are based on the priorities of the 
donor community. They believe they would only genuinely own these policies and 
programmes if they were underpinned by African priorities. 
On the issue of knowledge flows, some African analysts and policymakers believe that 
much of the knowledge that is consumed in Africa, including ideas about development, 
democratic reform and security, is generated from non-African sources. As a result, 
Africa continues to apply knowledge that is determined in and shaped by non-African 
contexts. Whether this knowledge has relevance for African conditions is a different 
matter. Moreover, they argue that the African voice has not been adequately represented 
in global debates on security matters in general, and on terrorism and counterterrorism 
in particular (see Okumu and Botha 2007). 
Therefore, some African thinkers and policymakers argue that the counterterrorism 
agenda that African states are required to implement does not take account of some 
of Africa’s pressing needs, especially those related to human development. Even the 
EU approach to counterterrorism does not address African concerns in the way that 
Africans would like them to be addressed. 
However, it could be argued that Africa’s lack of participation in the shaping of global 
knowledge flows can be blamed partly on African leaders and their misguided political 
and macro-economic policies. African states, which are rich in natural resources, have 
squandered their wealth and failed to invest adequately in education. This has, in turn, 
compelled many competent African thinkers and researchers to go to the West in search 
of adequate working conditions. By failing to fund education and research, African 
states have disadvantaged themselves when it comes to the generation of the knowledge 
they need. Even in the fields of development and security studies, there are many African 
Other African leaders, especially those who are 
keen to consolidate democracy, have been  
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researchers in the West who would be willing to return to 
their countries of origin if better working conditions were 
established.
Due to the lack of a common pool of knowledge on the causes 
of terrorism in Africa, each African state has developed its 
own unique approach to domestic terrorism. However, this 
has not prevented Africa, as a collective entity, from adopting 
a common position on global counterterrorism strategies. 
African states and sub-regions have huge differences over the 
nature and causes of terrorism on the continent and the way it should be tackled, but 
they have also arrived at common positions on how to prevent and combat terrorism. 
Algeria, Egypt, Kenya and Uganda, which have experienced different forms of terrorism 
in the past decade, have taken different approaches to it. Perhaps one common thread 
running through these states is their failure to establish competent, open, accountable 
and responsive governments.
Despite their differing approaches to counterterrorism, virtually all African states 
endorsed the adoption of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on 
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention) in July 1999. 
The Algiers Convention was the first continental legislative instrument to provide a 
definition of terrorism. Thus, Africa had a common approach to counterterrorism 
at least two years before the events of 11 September 2001 and the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373 and the establishment of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) compelled Africa, like the rest of the world, 
to adopt certain mandatory anti-terrorism measures. The 
transformation of the OAU into the AU took place in 2002 
when the world was focusing on transnational terrorism as 
a common threat to humankind. In subsequent years, the 
AU was required to play an important role in reinforcing 
and implementing the counterterrorism measures adopted at 
both the continental level and the global level.
The irony of the African position on terrorism and 
counterterrorism is that the AU selected the Libyan leader, 
Muammar Gaddafi, as its chairperson in January 2009. 
Gaddafi, who has participated in clandestine nuclear 
activities and has been accused repeatedly of funding 
terrorists, has become Africa’s spokesperson on global issues, 
including transnational terrorism. It is noteworthy in this 
context that in August 2003, Libya accepted responsibility 
for the terrorist bombing of the US passenger aircraft, Pan 
Am 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. The 
fact that Gaddafi’s hands are tainted as far as terrorism is 
concerned could weaken Africa’s claim that its different approaches to terrorism should 
be respected by international society.
African approaches to counterterrorism have had negative implications for democracy 
building on the continent. Even the genesis of the Algiers Convention was underpinned 
by efforts to deny African people their democratic rights. Algeria was the main driving 
Due to the lack of a common pool of knowledge on  
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force behind the Algiers Convention as a result of the terrorist problems it experienced 
from 1992. However, the rise of terrorism and political extremism in Algeria in the 
early 1990s was due partly to the nullification of general elections there, which the 
Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) was poised to 
win. Having been denied the chance to take power through the ballot box, FIS resorted 
to violence, together with other insurgent groups such as the Armed Islamic Group 
(Groupement Islamique Armé, GIA). Algeria could be cited as a case where frustration 
of the democratic system led to terrorism and political extremism. For many years, 
there has been no distinction between legitimate opposition and terrorism in the eyes 
of some African political leaders, and this has not been good for building democracy. 
It is plausible to argue that the lack of adequate knowledge on the part of some African 
leaders has constrained development and led to the poor state of democracy on the 
continent.
Since September 2001, some progressive forces in Africa 
have argued that the global counterterrorism policies that 
African states are required to implement also threaten 
democracy because they do not pay adequate attention 
to respect for individual liberties. In a paper on terrorism 
and global governance in 2003, I argued: ‘The events of 11 
September 2001 have been used by the US, major Western 
states and other important international actors as an excuse 
to undermine international rules, norms and institutions, 
including human rights, democracy and the laws of war. 
This has the potential to weaken the pillars on which global 
governance is constructed’ (Makinda 2003). This has been 
the case in Africa and other parts of the world.
In much of Africa, the domestic causes of terrorism have been associated with a lack of 
development, social justice and democracy. Development has the potential to reduce 
the chances of terrorism by eliminating or modifying the conditions that produce 
discontent. As the former World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, argued in March 
2002: 
We must recognise that while there is social injustice on a global scale – both 
between states and within them; while the fight against poverty is barely begun 
in too many parts of the world; while the link between progress in development 
and progress toward peace is not recognised – we may win a battle against terror 
but we will not conclude a war that will yield enduring peace (Wolfensohn 2002). 
It is important to bear in mind that poverty or the lack of development per se does 
not cause terrorism, but it might combine with other factors 
to ignite political violence. For example, extreme poverty, 
combined with the politics of identity, can be a factor in 
fuelling terror. People like those who masterminded the 11 
September 2001 attacks on the USA might have been rich, 
but they defined their identities in terms of the downtrodden. 
The reason why development is crucial to any strategy 
against terrorism is that it incorporates capacity-building in 
the broadest sense, thereby implying the introduction of new 
The reason why development is crucial to any 
strategy against terrorism is that it incorporates 
capacity-building in the broadest sense, thereby 
implying the introduction of new ideas, standards, 
institutions, norms and techniques for overcom-
ing obstacles to human progress. For this reason, 
development can help people to redefine their 
identities and refocus their interests and energies 
away from terrorism and political violence.
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ideas, standards, institutions, norms and techniques for overcoming obstacles to human 
progress. For this reason, development can help people to redefine their identities and 
refocus their interests and energies away from terrorism and political violence.
The absence of development, or the adoption of a distorted approach to development, 
often gives rise to perceptions of social injustice. Social justice has been defined as ‘a 
morally justifiable distribution of material and social rewards, notably wealth, income 
and social status’ (Heywood 2000). A country in which most of the wealth, income 
and social rewards are concentrated in the hands of a few ethnic groups or in one 
geographic region to the exclusion of other ethnic groups or 
geographical regions is considered socially unjust, and can 
easily ignite political violence. For example, the magnitude of 
the post-election violence in Kenya in early 2008 was partly 
due to the perception by people from various ethnic groups 
that the Kikuyu, President Mwai Kibaki’s ethnic group, had 
amassed most of the country’s wealth to the detriment of 
other groups. Thus, perceptions of social injustice can be a 
factor in causing political violence and terrorism.
On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to conclude that many people in Africa 
believe that the best way to tackle terrorism on the continent is to alleviate poverty, 
eliminate social injustice and assist with building democracy. 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
In its Statement on Strengthening International Security, published on 11 December 
2008, the Council of the European Union proclaimed: 
an unremitting determination to combat all manifestations of terrorism, in 
particular the threat posed by international terrorist organizations. We shall 
pursue this aim, with due regard for human rights, international humanitarian 
law and the right of asylum, by building a Europe safe from terrorism, cooperating 
on criminal matters and sharing information between European authorities more 
effectively’ (Council of the European Union 2008 (c), paragraph 3). 
This statement of intent is encouraging, but it needs to be followed up by concrete 
action. Moreover, the EU would make a great difference in Africa if it adopted the 
view that building democracy and enhancing social justice are preconditions for the 
reduction or elimination of the factors that generate terrorism.
Following the inauguration of Barack Obama as President of the USA on 20 January 
2009, and his decisions to sign executive orders closing the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility and prohibiting the torture of suspects, the global political and legal environments 
appear to favour those who would combat terrorism while respecting liberal democratic 
principles. The EU should build on the momentum generated by President Obama and 
support democracy building as part of the struggle against transnational terrorism. 
The fight against terrorism is primarily a governance issue
In efforts to cooperate with Africa in the fight against terrorism, the EU needs, first, 
A country in which most of the wealth, income and 
social rewards are concentrated in the hands of a few 
ethnic groups or in one geographic region to the  
exclusion of other ethnic groups or geographical 
regions is considered socially unjust, and can easily 
ignite political violence.
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to recognize that in Africa, the fight against terrorism is primarily a governance issue. 
Therefore, it should encourage the promotion of good and responsible governance as a 
way of tackling the root causes of terrorism. This is because terrorism emerges from, and 
thrives in, conditions in which democracy, human rights and social justice are perceived 
to be absent. Even where terrorism is not ‘home grown’, bad governance, corruption or 
a lack of professionalism in the security forces might make it easier for foreign-trained 
terrorists to carry out their activities. However, in pursuing its goals, the EU needs to 
be aware of the political and cultural sensitivities of the African people.
Focus on strengthening democratic processes
Second, and flowing from the first point, the EU needs to focus on working with 
governments as well as civil society organizations to strengthen democratic processes. 
This requires a number of things. For example, the EU could train young Africans in 
proper processes of governance so that they can provide leadership at the governmental 
or civil society level. The EU could also help fund weak, but non-corrupt, civil society 
organizations so that they can scrutinize and stand up to their governments. Above 
all, the EU could help African states and societies to nurture an independent media 
and ensure that corrupt politicians do not pass legislation that muzzles the media. It is 
through such measures that the EU could help to build the foundations for democracy 
and accountability in Africa. These activities could be undertaken as part of the efforts 
to undermine or eliminate the root causes of terrorism. 
Undertake targeted capacity-building
Third, to ensure that the goals of prevention, protection, pursuit and response are 
replicated in Africa, the EU needs to undertake targeted capacity-building. It needs 
to help African states train personnel capable of detecting terrorists before they carry 
out their activities. It also needs to retrain and sensitize African security personnel to 
human rights and democratic norms so that they can protect their societies, and pursue 
the terrorists, without undermining democratic principles. 
Fight against terrorism and democracy building are two sides of the 
same coin
Finally, the EU needs to view the fight against terrorism and democracy building in 
Africa as two sides of the same coin. If the fight against terrorism neglects the need for 
democracy and social justice, it could produce more terrorists and thereby undermine 
its ultimate goal of creating peace and security in Africa.
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